Pragmatics/History/1950s

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1950s

1950 Rapoport

1950 Strawson

1951 Lewin

1952 Hutchins

1953 Deutsch

1953 Wittgenstein

1954 Black

1954 Chase

1955 Austin

1955 McCarthy

1956 Whorf

1957 Cherry

The suggestion that words are symbols for things, actions, qualities, relationships, et cetera, is naive, a gross simplification. Words are slippery customers. The full meaning of a word does not appear until it is placed in its context, and the context may serve an extremely subtle function -- as with puns, or double entendre. And even then the "meaning" will depend upon the listener, upon the speaker, upon their entire experience of language, upon their knowledge of one another, and upon the whole situation. Words do not "mean things" in a one-to-one relation like a code. Words, too, are empirical signs, not copies or models of anything; truly, onomatopoeia and gestures frequently seem to possess resemblance, but this resemblance does not bear too close examination. A cockerel may seem to say cook-a-doodle-do to an Englishman, but a German thinks it says kikeriki, and a Japanese kokke-kekko. Each can paint only with the phonetic sound of his own language. (p. 10-11)

From What Is It That We Communicate?

See also

1957 Osgood

1957 Skinner

1958 Polanyi

1959 Chomsky

1959 Gellner

1959 Snow

Notes

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